BEFORE THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )
) WC Docket No. 09-135
Petition of Qwest Corporation for )
Forbearance Pursuant to 47 USC §160(c) )
In the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan )
Statistical Area )

COMPTEL’S OPPOSITION TO QWEST PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE

September 21, 2009
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SUMMARY

Almost exactly eight months after the Commission denied Qwest’s last Petition for Forbearance from loop and transport unbundling requirements, dominant carrier regulation and Computer III requirements in the Phoenix MSA, Qwest came back to the Commission asking for the same relief again. At the same time the Commission is seeking comment on Qwest’s second petition for forbearance in Phoenix, the decision denying Qwest’s first petition is back before the Commission on remand from the Court of Appeals. In requesting comments on the remand, the Commission has sought input on the market share test to be applied in forbearance proceedings. COMPTEL’s comments in the remand proceeding are attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

The Commission should again deny Qwest’s request for deregulatory relief in Phoenix because Qwest has again failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the statutory provisions and Commission regulations from which it seeks forbearance is not necessary to (1) ensure that Qwest’s rates, charges, practices and regulations are just, reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory, (2) protect consumers and (3) serve the public interest.

As a preliminary matter, the Commission should summarily deny Qwest’s requests for forbearance from the Computer III requirements and dominant carrier regulation. Qwest made no showing whatsoever with respect to how forbearance from the Computer III requirements would satisfy each prong of Section 10(a) of the Communications Act. With respect to dominant carrier regulation, the Commission has already granted Qwest substantial forbearance throughout its 14 state service territory. In its Petition, Qwest has not demonstrated that it is entitled to additional relief, nor has it
remedied any of the failures of proof identified by the Commission in the *Qwest Nondominance Order*.

Most importantly, the Commission must deny Qwest’s request to be relieved of its statutory unbundling obligations. At the outset, Qwest has failed to demonstrate that Section 251(c) or Section 271 have been fully implemented in the Phoenix MSA, a necessary precondition to the Commission’s entertaining a request for forbearance under Section 10(d).

Qwest has failed to come forward with reliable evidence that there is sufficient facilities-based competition in either the wholesale or the retail Phoenix MSA markets to warrant forbearance. Qwest inappropriately discounts its retail residential market share by a wireless substitution rate estimated at 25 percent. Qwest has failed to provide sufficient detail on the methodology used by Market Strategies International to arrive at that estimate, making it impossible for the Commission to gauge its reliability. Nor has Qwest shown that wireless competition constrains its ability to raise its wireline prices or otherwise exercise market power.

Qwest also failed to provide any reliable evidence of its own retail business market share, relying instead on the results of a survey that asked 1500 business customers to identify their primary telecommunications carrier. Qwest does not disclose, however, how many of the survey respondents are served by carriers using Qwest’s wholesale facilities and services. Nor did Qwest provide any details with respect to the methodology used to conduct the survey or select the respondents, making it impossible for the Commission to verify the reliability of the survey results.
Qwest has not shown that there is adequate wholesale competition to discipline its post-forbearance rates. The only evidence Qwest provided of facilities-based competition in the wholesale market conclusively shows that carriers provide last mile access to only a fraction of the commercial buildings in the Phoenix MSA.

For all of these reasons, the Commission must deny Qwest’s Petition for Forbearance from dominant carrier, *Computer III* and unbundling regulation in the Phoenix MSA.
In the Matter of )
) WC Docket No. 09-135
Petition of Qwest Corporation for )
Forbearance Pursuant to 47 USC §160(c) )
In the Phoenix Metropolitan )
Statistical Area )

COMPTEL’S OPPOSITION TO QWEST’S PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE

COMPTEL hereby opposes Qwest Corporation’s Petition for Forbearance from (1) its obligations to provide wholesale access to voice grade DS0, DS1 and DS3 unbundled loops and transport, (2) dominant carrier regulation and (3) Computer III requirements in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”).¹

Specifically, Qwest requests forbearance from the loop and transport unbundling requirements of both Section 251(c)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§251(c) and 271(c)(2)(B)(ii), and Section 1.319 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§51.319(a), (b), (e); from the dominant carrier tariff requirements set forth in Part 61 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.32, 61.33, 61.38, 61.58 and 61.59; from the Commission’s price cap regulations, 47 C.F.R. §§61.41-61.49; from the dominant carrier requirements arising under Section 214 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §214, and Part 63 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.03 and 63.04, concerning the process for acquiring lines, discontinuing services and making assignments or transfers of

¹ Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phoenix Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area filed March 24, 2009 at 7-11 (“Qwest Petition”).
control; and from the “Computer III requirements, including Comparably Efficient Interconnection (‘CEI’) and Open Network Architecture (‘ONA’) requirements.”\(^2\) This Petition represents Qwest’s second attempt to achieve identical deregulation for its wholesale and retail services in Phoenix. The Commission denied its earlier forbearance petition just over a year ago\(^3\) and has not yet acted on the remand of that decision from the Court of Appeals.\(^4\)

As it has done before, Qwest alleges that in the 64 wire centers that make up its service area in the Phoenix MSA, it faces “competition from a wide range of technologies and a broad array of service providers”\(^5\) including wireline, wireless, cable and VoIP providers, and that the competitiveness of the market is evidenced by its declining market share.\(^6\) Qwest has failed to demonstrate, however, that elimination of the dominant carrier, Computer III or unbundling requirements to which it is subject will promote competitive market conditions or enhance competition among service providers,

\(^2\) \textit{Id.}


\(^5\) Qwest Petition at 1. Qwest made the identical allegation in its earlier petition requesting forbearance for the Phoenix MSA. See Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area filed April 27, 2007, WC Docket No. 07-97, at 1.

\(^6\) Qwest Petition at 3-4.
constrain its rates, terms or conditions of service or protect consumers. For these reasons, Qwest’s Petition should be denied.

I. The Statutory Standard

Qwest bears a heavy burden in proving that it meets the statutory prerequisites to obtain forbearance from the loop and transport unbundling requirements of the Commission’s rules and Section 251(c)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Communications Act; the dominant carrier requirements of the Commission’s rules and Section 214 of the Act; and the Commission’s Computer III requirements. Section 10(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §160, provides that the Commission may not grant forbearance from any provision of the Act or any Commission regulation unless and until it determines that three conditions have been satisfied. The Commission must make affirmative findings that (1) enforcement of the provision of the Act or the Commission regulation is not necessary to ensure that Qwest’s charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of the provision or regulation is not necessary for the protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying the provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest.

In making the public interest determination, Section 10(b) requires the Commission to consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions and enhance competition among telecommunications providers. If the Commission determines that forbearance will promote competition among providers of telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a finding that forbearance is in the public interest.
Section 10(d) prohibits the Commission from forbearing from Section 251(c)(3) or Section 271 until it determines that those requirements have been fully implemented.

The Commission’s interpretation of the statutory standard with respect to forbearance from the unbundling requirements is the subject of the remands of the Verizon 6 MSA\(^7\) and Qwest 4 MSA\(^8\) decisions. The Court of Appeals has instructed the Commission to better articulate the basis for denying the Verizon and Qwest petitions for unbundling relief in the 10 MSAs. Specifically, the Court stated that

\[
\text{Indeed, it may be reasonable in certain instances for the FCC to consider an ILEC’s possession of [redacted] percent, or any other particular percentage, of the marketplace, as a key factor in the agency’s determination that a marketplace is not sufficiently competitive to ensure its competitors’ abilities to compete. It may also be reasonable for the FCC to consider only evidence of actual competition rather than actual and potential competition. Nevertheless, it is arbitrary and capricious for the FCC to apply such new approaches without providing a satisfactory explanation when it has not followed such approaches in the past.}^{9}
\]

Consistent with the Court’s instructions, on remand the Commission must articulate a workable market share standard – one that examines competition in both the retail market and the wholesale market -- to determine whether a geographic market is sufficiently competitive to warrant elimination of the statutory requirements that Congress deemed


\(^9\) *Id.* at 26.
necessary to open markets to competition and provide consumers with a choice of providers, and of Commission regulations designed to avoid abuse of market power.

Simultaneously with this filing, COMPTEL is submitting its Comments on the remand of the Verizon and Qwest decisions\(^\text{10}\) (a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference) in which it proposes a standard that will more accurately assess the likelihood that market forces will be sufficient to constrain the ILEC’s rates, terms and conditions of service, protect consumers and enhance competition if the Commission lifts the ILEC’s statutory obligation to provide wholesale access to unbundled loops and transport. Specifically, when an ILEC seeks to be relieved of its statutory UNE wholesale obligations and there are competitors in the market that use the ILEC’s UNEs to provide service to their own customers, the Commission should not grant forbearance unless the ILEC is able to demonstrate with hard evidence that (1) its retail market share is less than 50%, and only lines served by a competitor solely over its own or a third party carrier’s network and facilities are attributed to the competitive side of the equation and (2) there are at least two alternative facilities-based wholesale providers in addition to the ILEC whose networks reach and are capable of serving 100% of the customer locations in the geographic area for which forbearance is sought.

As discussed below, Qwest has not come forward with reliable or verifiable evidence that it meets this standard. Nor has it come forward with reliable or verifiable evidence that would support a determination that further forbearance from dominant

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\(^{10}\) See Comments of COMPTEL filed in WC Docket Nos. 06-172 and 07-97 on September 21, 2009.

carrier regulation or the *Computer III* requirements is warranted. Accordingly, the Commission should deny Qwest’s Petition.

II. Qwest Is Not Entitled To Further Forbearance From Dominant Carrier Regulation

In March and August 2007, the Commission granted Qwest substantial forbearance from dominant carrier tariffing and price cap regulation throughout its 14-state service territory. Specifically, the Commission determined that Qwest’s provision of in-region, interstate, interLATA retail telecommunications service is no longer subject to the requirements of Section 203 of the Act or Sections 63.03, 63.19, 63.21, 63.23 and 63.60 – 63.90 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§63.03, 63.19, 63.21, 63.23, 63.60-63.90, only to the extent that Qwest would be treated as a dominant carrier under these rules for no reason other than its provision of those services on an integrated basis. The Commission also determined that Qwest will not be required to, and in fact is prohibited from, filing tariffs for in-region, interstate, interLATA telecommunications services pursuant to Sections 61.31-61.38 and 61.43 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§61.31-61.38 and 61.43; that Qwest is not required to establish an “interexchange basket” pursuant to Section 61.42(d)(4) of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §61.42(d)(4); and that Qwest would not be subject to Sections 61.28 and 43.51 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§61.28 and 43.51, to the extent that, and only to the

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extent that, it would be treated as a dominant carrier under those Sections for no reason other than its provision of in-region, interstate or international telecommunications service on an integrated basis.\textsuperscript{12}

The Commission further determined that Qwest had failed to present persuasive evidence that “it no longer possesses exclusionary market power within its region as a result of its control over a ubiquitous telephone exchange service and exchange access network.”\textsuperscript{13} As a result of Qwest’s exclusionary control over these bottleneck access facilities, the Commission declined to relieve Qwest from dominant carrier regulation of its interstate exchange access services, including tariffing and price cap regulation\textsuperscript{14}-- the very same relief it requests here. A year later, the Commission denied Qwest’s petition for further forbearance from dominant carrier regulation of its mass market and enterprise switched access services in the Phoenix MSA on the grounds that it had not demonstrated that all three prongs of Section 10 would be satisfied if forbearance was granted.\textsuperscript{15}

In this its third attempt to achieve deregulation of its interstate access services, Qwest has again failed to present persuasive evidence that it no longer possesses exclusionary market power as a result of its control over a ubiquitous local exchange and exchange access network in the Phoenix MSA or that it is otherwise entitled to further forbearance from enforcement of the dominant carrier regulations to its switched access services. Instead, Qwest makes basically the same arguments here that it has made

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Id. at ¶¶ 76-78.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Id. at ¶¶ 20, 68, 90; \textit{Qwest Nondominance Order} at ¶¶47, 54-59.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{Qwest 4MSA Order} at ¶24.
\end{itemize}
before in requesting nondominant treatment. Qwest’s complaint that tariffing and price

cap regulation prevent it from responding to “competitors’ bundled service offerings,”

market conditions and competition is nonsense. 16 Subsequent to filing its Petition,

Qwest publicly announced that it had extended for five years its strategic partnership with

DIRECTV, and crowed that it “offers customers bundle discounts for Qwest High-Speed

Internet® and DIRECTV services, the convenience of one bill and personalized bundles
designed to meet their specific communication and entertainment needs.” Qwest further

explained that the “powerful combination of Qwest High-Speed Internet and DIRECTV

provides opportunities for the companies to create and launch integrated features that
differentiate the Qwest bundle from cable.” 17 Despite its protest that dominant carrier

regulation is somehow holding it back, it does not appear from Qwest’s public

announcements that either price cap regulation or any other dominant carrier regulation is

inhibiting Qwest’s ability to respond to market conditions or its competitors’—
specifically cable’s—bundled service offerings.

The Commission observed in the Qwest Nondominance Order, that:

Qwest asserts that it faces “significant” competition within its region from

“wireline, wireless, and other forms of intermodal competition,” that its retail

access line base has “declined significantly,” and that its “connection share” of

the residential local exchange market is declining. Qwest has failed, however, to

present persuasive evidence that it no longer possesses exclusionary market power

within its region as a result of its control over a ubiquitous telephone exchange

service and exchange access network. 18

16 Qwest Petition at 46.

17 “Qwest and DIRECTV Reach Agreement To Extend Strategic Alliance,” (July


18 Qwest Nondominance Order at ¶47, quoting the Teitzel Declaration filed with the

Qwest nondominance forbearance petition.
In this Petition, Qwest similarly asserts that it “is now subject to extensive mass market and enterprise market competition” in the Phoenix MSA from “a wide variety of intramodal and intermodal competitors, including (but not limited to) Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (‘CLECs’), cable companies, wireless providers and Voice over Internet Protocol (‘VoIP’) providers.”19 As a result of this competition, Qwest alleges that the “Phoenix MSA is one of the most competitive telecommunications markets in the U.S.”20 and that its “retail access line base in the Phoenix MSA has fallen sharply since 2000.”21 Qwest, however, has again failed to present persuasive evidence that it no longer possesses exclusionary market power by reason of its control over bottleneck access facilities.

Having elected not to address the deficiency in its proof which the Commission identified in the Qwest Nondominance Order, Qwest is not entitled to any additional dominant carrier forbearance relief. As the Commission has previously determined, application of the Section 10(a) criteria “is no simple task and a decision to forbear must be based upon a record that contains more than broad, unsupported allegations of why those criteria are met.”22 Qwest’s invocation of the mantra that the Section 10 criteria are satisfied because of the presence of competitors in Phoenix is not sufficient to carry the day. Qwest continues to maintain control over a ubiquitous telephone exchange

19 Qwest Petition, Brigham Declaration at ¶2 (emphasis in the original).

20 Id. at ¶ 5.

21 Id. at ¶ 3.

22 In the Matters of Bell Operating Companies Petitions For Forbearance From The Application of Section 272 of the Communications Act of 1934 To Certain Activities, 13 FCC Rcd 2627 at ¶16 (1998).
service and exchange access network in Phoenix and continues to have exclusionary market power. For these reasons, the Commission should deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from dominant carrier regulation of its switched access services beyond that which the Commission has already granted in the Section 272 Sunset Order and the Qwest Nondominance Order.

The Commission should also deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from price cap regulation of its switched access services because it has not shown that such relief would not adversely affect access charges in areas of the Arizona study area outside of the Phoenix MSA. In the Verizon 6 MSA Order, the Commission noted that because its rules require incumbent LECs to geographically average their access rates, price cap ILECs with state wide operations effectively use their lower-cost, urban and suburban operations to subsidize their higher-cost rural operations. The likely impact of removing from price cap regulation lower cost operations in large urban MSAs would be to increase the cost to the ILEC’s more rural operations.23 For this reason the Commission directed future applicants for forbearance from dominant carrier rate regulation to address whether and how a grant of relief at the geographic level they seek would impact other rates in the applicable study area.24

While acknowledging the Commission’s directive, Qwest’s response raises more questions than it answers.25 Qwest states that it will use the Part 69 and Part 61 rules to calculate maximum Subscriber Line Charge (“SLC”) rates “as if” the demand for the

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23 Verizon 6 MSA Order at n.102

24 Id.

25 Qwest Petition at 9-10.
SLCs [in the Phoenix MSA] was still being treated as dominant and subject to the rules. The maximum SLC rates would be produced for the entire study area and would represent the maximum rates which could be charged. *The actual rates in the non-dominant tariff or contracts could be lower.*

What this seems to indicate is that if forbearance is granted, the Qwest customers in the more rural areas of Arizona will pay for the deregulation of the switched access rates in the Phoenix MSA through higher SLC charges than the Phoenix customers pay. Because the population of the Phoenix MSA is approximately 66% of the population of the state of Arizona, such an arrangement will allow Qwest to recover subscriber line costs disproportionately from the one-third of the population that lives outside the Phoenix MSA. For this reason, Qwest has failed to show that price cap regulation is not necessary to ensure that its charges, practices, classifications or regulations for mass market switched access services are just, reasonable and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. The Commission should deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from dominant carrier regulation.

**III. Qwest Is Not Entitled To Further Forbearance From The Computer III Requirements**

Although Qwest asks the Commission to forbear from enforcing the *Computer III* requirements, including the Comparably Efficient Interconnection (“CEI”) and Open Network Architecture (“ONA”) requirements, it did not even make an attempt to show that grant of its request would satisfy each prong of Section 10(a). Indeed, Qwest mentions *Computer III* only twice in its Petition – once in the paragraph where it

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26 Qwest Petition at 9 (emphasis added).

27 See Qwest Petition at 5 and [http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html](http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html).

28 Qwest Petition at 11.
describes what it wants forbearance from and once in the conclusion where it reiterates its request for relief. Qwest made absolutely no effort whatsoever to explain how or why enforcement of the CEI, ONA or any other Computer III requirements is not necessary either to ensure that its rates, terms and conditions of service are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory or to protect consumers. Nor did Qwest discuss how or why forbearance from the Computer III requirements would be consistent with the public interest.

In order to meet the public interest forbearance criterion, the Commission has ruled that a petitioner must explain how the benefits of a regulation can be attained in the event of forbearance. Qwest has not done so. The CEI and ONA requirements were implemented to prevent the Bell Operating Companies (“BOCs”) from discriminating against unaffiliated information services providers. In light of the continuing validity of the Commission’s finding that Qwest possesses exclusionary market power within its region as a result of its control over a ubiquitous telephone exchange service and exchange access network, Qwest clearly retains the ability to discriminate in providing access to that network to unaffiliated information service providers. Qwest did not bother to address how the nondiscrimination objectives of the CEI and ONA requirements could be achieved if the Commission were to forbear from applying the requirements.

29 Qwest Petition at 11 and 47.

30 In the Matter of Petition of Ameritech Corporation for Forbearance from Enforcement of Section 275(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 15 FCC Rcd 7066 at ¶ 7 (1999).

31 California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 at 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1994).

32 Qwest Nondominance Order at ¶47.
The Commission must deny a petition for forbearance if it finds that any one of the three prongs of the Section 10(a) test is unsatisfied. Qwest offered no evidence or argument that even one of the three prongs would be satisfied absent enforcement of the \textit{Computer III} requirements. Instead, it alleged simply that forbearance would allow it “to respond quickly to customer demands for information services with innovative offerings.” Significantly, Qwest did not claim that compliance with the \textit{Computer III} requirements prevents it from responding quickly to customer demands. Based on the self-description included in the “About Qwest” section of its press releases, the \textit{Computer III} requirements do not appear to be inhibiting Qwest from providing innovative product offerings at all:

Customers coast to coast turn to Qwest’s industry-leading national fiber-optic network and world-class customer service to meet their communications and entertainment needs. For residential customers, Qwest offers a new generation of fiber-optic high-speed Internet service, as well as digital home phone, Verizon Wireless, and DIRECTV services. Qwest is also the choice of 95 percent of Fortune 500 companies, offering a full suite of network, data and voice services for small businesses, large businesses and government agencies and wholesale customers. Additionally, Qwest participates in Networx, the largest communications services contract in the world, and is recognized as a leader in the network services market by a leading technology industry analyst firm.

The Commission previously denied Qwest’s request for forbearance from the \textit{Computer III} requirements in Phoenix because Qwest failed to present any evidence that application of the requirements is not necessary within the meaning of Section 10(a).

\begin{itemize}
\item Qwest Petition at 11.
\item See “Qwest Reports First Quarter 2009 Results, “ (Apr. 29, 2009), available at \url{http://news.qwest.com/index.php?s=43&item=23}.
\item \textit{Qwest 4 MSA Order} at ¶ 44.
\end{itemize}
The Commission should reach the same result here because again, Qwest has chosen to ask for the same relief with no showing that it is warranted.37

IV. The Commission Cannot Find That Section 251(c) or Section 271 is Fully Implemented

The Commission is barred by statute from granting Qwest’s request for forbearance from Section 251(c) and Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) at this time. Section 10(d) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §160(d), provides that the Commission may not forbear from applying the requirements of Sections 251(c) or 271 until it “determines that those requirements have been fully implemented.” These are the only two sections of the statute for which full implementation is a precondition to the grant of forbearance.

A. Section 251(c)

In the Omaha Forbearance Order, the Commission stated that Section 251(c) had been fully implemented for all incumbent LECs nationwide “because the Commission has issued rules implementing section 251(c) and those rules have gone into effect.”38 The Commission further held that “incumbent LECs comply with Section 251(c) and the Commission’s rules, but in this context are not properly said to be implementing the statutory provision.”39 This position, however, is inconsistent with the statutory language as well as Commission precedent. Although this issue was raised in the appeal of the Omaha Forbearance Order, the D.C. Circuit declined to rule on the arguments regarding

37 See Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶¶16, 111 (where Qwest failed to demonstrate how forbearance from certain statutory provisions and Commission regulations would satisfy Section 10, Commission refused to compose an affirmative case for forbearance relief on Qwest’s behalf).

38 Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶53.

39 Id. (emphasis in the original).
the inconsistency between the Commission’s current interpretation of Section 251(c) and the Commission’s prior rulings that state commissions, ILECs and competitive carriers all have a role to play in the implementation of Section 251(c) because the petitioners had failed to adequately raise the issue before the Commission.\(^{40}\) The Commission needs to either explain the inconsistency or reconsider its previous determination that Section 251(c) has been fully implemented.

Section 251(d) provides that the Commission “within 6 months after February 8, 1996 shall complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.” In contrast, in Section 10(d), Congress prohibits the Commission from forbearing from applying the requirements of Section 251(c) until it determines that those requirements have been “fully implemented.” If Congress had intended to give the Commission authority to forbear from applying Section 251(c) as soon as rules implementing Section 251(c) had been adopted and gone into effect, there would be nothing for the Commission to “determine” in terms of whether the requirements of Section 251(c) had been fully implemented. Moreover, the use of the adverb “fully” to modify “implemented” in Section 10(d) clearly shows that Congress had more in mind than merely adopting regulations to implement the requirements of Section 251.\(^{41}\) The Commission itself previously agreed with this interpretation and so represented to the D.C. Circuit. In \textit{ASCENT v. FCC}, the Court noted that

\(^{40}\) \textit{Qwest Corporation v. FCC}, 482 F.3d 471, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

\(^{41}\) \textit{See Rusello v. U.S.}, 464 U.S.16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).
But the Commission may not forbear from applying the requirements of Section 251(c) . . . "until it determines that those requirements have been fully implemented." Because those requirements have not been fully implemented here, the FCC (as it concedes) may not forbear.42

The Commission must adhere to its own precedent or explain its reasons for reversing course.43 In adopting regulations pursuant to Section 251(c), the Commission correctly found that the adoption of rules was only the start of the process toward full implementation of Section 251(c) and that full implementation would require action not only by the Commission, but also by the state commissions, the ILECs and competitors. Specifically, in the Local Competition Order, the Commission concluded that its adoption of Section 251(c) rules was merely “the initial measure[] that will enable the states and the Commission to begin to implement sections 251 and 252.”44 It further described its rules as a means to “facilitate administration of section 251 and 252 …. ”45 Thus, it is clear that the Commission – consistent with the statutory language -- viewed its rules as the means, not the end, to full implementation of Section 251. The Commission viewed implementation of Section 251(c) as involving substantial activity by the Commission, the states and the ILECs well beyond the effective date of rules established by the FCC. Indeed, it found that “Section 252 generally sets forth the

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42 ASCENT v. FCC, 235 F. 3d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

43 Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(FCC must explain its reasons for reversing its course; enumerate factual differences between similar cases; and explain the relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Act.)


45 Id. at ¶41.
procedures that state commissions, incumbent LECs and new entrants must follow to implement the requirements of Section 251 and establish specific interconnection arrangements.”

The Commission previously has found that the states have a substantial role to play in the full implementation of Section 251. It interpreted Section 251 as “creating parallel jurisdiction for the FCC and the states” and as involving an “allocation of responsibilities” between it and the states. The Commission, for example, found that while some of its rules may be self-executing, “in many instances, however, the rules we establish call on the states to exercise significant discretion and to make critical decisions through arbitrations and development of state-specific rules.” It also found that in some cases its rules only “identify broad principles and leave to the states the determination of what specific requirements are necessary to satisfy those principles.”

Indeed, the Commission concluded that it was Congress’s intent for states to play a role in the implementation of Section 251. According to the Commission, “Congress envisioned complementary and significant roles for the Commission and the states with respect to the rates for section 251 services, interconnection, and access to unbundled

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46 Id. at ¶ 116. See also AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 384 (1999) (“It is the states that will apply the [Commission’s TELRIC pricing] standards and implement that methodology determining the concrete results in particular circumstances.”)

47 Id. at ¶ 85.

48 Id. at ¶ 41.

49 Id.

50 Id. at ¶ 67.
elements.”\textsuperscript{51} If Congress intended the states to have a significant role in implementing the statutory provision, then it could not have intended that the Commission’s action in promulgating rules and the passage of the effective date of those rules alone to be sufficient to deem Section 251(c) “fully implemented.” The Commission must consult with the state commissions to assess whether Section 251(c) has been fully implemented, rather than making a nationwide determination.

The Commission also recognized the important role the ILECs have to play in the implementation of Section 251. In particular, the Commission found that the ILECs have certain obligations under Section 251.\textsuperscript{52} In the \textit{UNE Remand Order}, the Commission stated that “[b]ecause unbundled network elements have not been made fully available to competitors as the Commission expected in 1996, we do not yet know the extent to which competition will develop once all of the unbundling rules are actually implemented by the incumbent LECs.”\textsuperscript{53} In the \textit{Triennial Review Remand Order}, released just seven months before the adoption of the \textit{Omaha Forbearance Order}, the Commission again recognized the role that State commissions, ILECs and CLECs must play in implementing Section 251:

> We expect that incumbent LECs and competitive carriers will \textit{implement} the Commission’s [unbundling determinations] as directed by Section 252 of the Act. Thus, carriers must \textit{implement} changes to their interconnection agreements

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Id.} at ¶ 111.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Id.} at ¶¶ 54, 307; \textit{see also} \textit{AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board}, 525 U.S. at 371 (under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ILECs are subject to a host of duties intended to facilitate market entry, including the duty to share their networks with competitors).

consistent with the conclusions in this Order. . . . Thus, the incumbent LEC and competitive LEC must negotiate in good faith regarding any rates, terms and conditions necessary to implement our rule changes. We expect that parties to the negotiating process will not unreasonably delay implementation of the conclusions adopted in this Order. We encourage the state commissions to monitor this area closely to ensure that parties do not engage in unreasonable delay.\footnote{In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd 2533 at ¶233 (2005) (“TRRO”) (emphasis added).}

For the Commission to conclude less than a year later that it is the only “entity that ‘implements’ Section 251(c)”\footnote{Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶¶53-54.} and that the ILECs play no role in implementing Section 251(c) without explanation or analysis as to why it was abandoning its original interpretation of the statute fails to pass the reasoned decision making test. As the Court stated in\textit{Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{[W]}hen an agency decides to reverse its course, it must provide an opinion or analysis indicating that the standard is being changed and not ignored, and assuring that it is faithful and not indifferent to the rule of law.
\end{quote}

Faced with two facially conflicting decisions, the Commission was duty bound to justify their co-existence. The Commission’s utter failure to come to grips with this problem constitutes an inexcusable departure from the essential requirement of reasoned decision making.\footnote{454 F.2d at 1026.}

Section 251 cannot be “fully implemented” until Qwest fully satisfies its unbundling and other market-opening obligations imposed by the statute. Without input from the affected state commissions and the competitors for whom Section 251(c) was designed to facilitate entry, the Commission cannot possibly determine that Section 251(c) has been “fully implemented” simply because it has adopted implementing regulations and those regulations have gone into effect.
The Commission’s determination in the *Omaha Forbearance Order* that ILECs do not have a role in implementing Section 251(c) not only directly contradicts its prior precedent, but it is also nonsensical. Section 251(c) imposes specific duties on ILECs, including the duty to provide to requesting telecommunications carriers nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements. The Commission does not have the ability to actually provide requesting carriers access to unbundled network elements — *i.e.*, to implement a duty imposed on third parties — only the ILECs do, as the Commission confirmed in the *UNE Remand Order*. The Commission cannot reverse its interpretation of Section 251(c) without acknowledging its prior precedent and providing a full explanation as to why that interpretation was incorrect.

The Commission’s holding in the *Omaha Forbearance Order* that it is the only entity that “implements” Section 251 and that Section 251(c) has been “fully implemented” for all ILECs nationwide because the rules it has promulgated have gone into effect[^57] cannot be reconciled with its prior interpretation of the statute. Reading the statute to mean that the Commission could grant forbearance from Section 251(c) as soon as its implementing regulations became effective — before any action with regard to those regulations may have been taken — eviscerates the very purpose of the rules and the statutory provision. The Commission should revisit its ruling in the *Omaha Forbearance Order* and consult with the Arizona Commission with respect to whether Qwest has fully implemented Section 251(c). Qwest’s failure to provide any evidence with respect to its implementation of Section 251(c) warrants denial of its request for forbearance.

[^57]: *Omaha Forbearance Order* at ¶53.
B. Section 271

The Commission should also revisit its conclusion that Section 271 has been fully implemented once the Commission grants a BOC authority to provide interLATA service.\footnote{See, In the Matters of Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies, et al. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §160(c), WC Docket Nos. 01-338 et al., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 04-254 (rel. Oct. 27, 2004) at ¶15.} In the \textit{Omaha Forbearance Order}, the Commission stated that:

With respect to the competitive checklist requirements of Section 271(c), however, these requirements first attach to the BOCs as obligations only after the BOCs have sufficiently opened their markets to competition under the standards set forth in section 271(c)(2)(B), and after the Commission has granted the BOC approval under 271(a) to provide in-region interLATA services.\footnote{\textit{Omaha Forbearance Order} at ¶54.}

If the Section 271 checklist obligations do not even attach to the BOCs until \textit{after} the Commission has granted them interLATA operating authority, a determination that Section 271 has been fully implemented before the obligations attach -- i.e., at the time the Commission grants that authority -- makes no sense. Given the large number of unbundled loops and EELs that competing carriers currently purchase from Qwest in the Phoenix MSA,\footnote{See Qwest Petition at 29 and Qwest Highly Confidential Exhibit 7.} the Commission must examine whether Qwest will fully implement its obligation to provide unbundled access to loops and transport at just and reasonable rates pursuant to Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) and (v) before granting forbearance from the obligation to provide access at cost-based rates pursuant to 271(c)(2)(B)(ii). Based on the Omaha experience, there is no reason to believe that Qwest will do so.

The Commission thus far has failed to identify a pricing methodology that would yield just and reasonable rates for Section 271 elements. The Commission has also turned a deaf ear to a request by the Georgia Public Service Commission to clarify
whether states are preempted by federal law from setting just and reasonable rates for Section 271 elements.61 State Commissions that established rates for Section 271 elements have been routinely rebuffed by the Courts of Appeals, which have uniformly held that only the Commission has authority to set Section 271 rates and otherwise enforce that provision of the statute.62 The Commission’s inaction has allowed the BOCs to avoid their Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) and (v) obligations to offer unbundled loops and transport by forcing their supracompetitively priced special access services on competitors as the only alternative once they have been relieved of the obligation to provide access pursuant to Section 251(c)(3). The Commission’s failure to give any meaning to the BOCs’ independent obligation to provide access to loops and transport pursuant to Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) and (v) precludes a finding that Section 271 has been fully implemented.

In the TRRO, the Commission reasoned that because incumbent carriers offered tariffed special access products since before the passage of the Telecommunications Act in 1996, Congress’ enactment of Section 251(c)(3) at a time when special access services were already available to carriers in the local exchange market indicates that Section 251(c)(3) UNEs were intended as alternatives to special access. 63 The same is true with

61 The Georgia PSC filed a Petition three and one-half years ago asking the Commission to either clarify that it is not preempted by federal law from setting just and reasonable rates for Section 271 elements; if it is preempted, to declare the rates set by the Georgia Commission for Section 271 elements are just and reasonable; or set the rates itself for the Section 271 elements. See In the Matter of Georgia Public Service Commission’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling and Confirmation of Just and Reasonableness of Established Rates, WC Docket No. 06-90 (filed Apr. 28, 2006). The Commission has taken no action on the Petition.

62 See e.g., Verizon New England, Inc. v. Maine Public Utilities Commission, 509 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
respect to Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) loops and Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) transport. Those provisions were also enacted at a time when special access services were already available to carriers in the local exchange market and they also were intended as alternatives to special access. As the Commission stated in the TRRO, with respect to Section 251(c)(3)

> It would be a hideous irony if the incumbent LECs, simply by offering a service, the pricing of which falls largely within their control, could utterly avoid the structure instituted by Congress to, in the words of the Supreme Court, “give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter local retail telephone markets, short of confiscating the incumbents’ property.”\(^{64}\)

It would also be a hideous irony if the ILECs, simply by offering their tariffed special services, the pricing of which falls largely if not wholly within their control, could utterly avoid their obligations to offer unbundled loops and transport pursuant to Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv), and (v). The Commission must give meaning to those statutory provisions by establishing at the very least a pricing methodology before it can find that they have been fully implemented. The Commission must not forbear from enforcing Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) until it determines by reasoned decision making that Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv), and (v) have been fully implemented.

V. Qwest Has Not Shown That It Is Entitled To Forbearance From Its Obligations To Offer Unbundled Loops and Transport

Should the Commission decline to revisit its finding that Section 251(c) and 271 have been fully implemented nationwide, it still must deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from its Section 251(c)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) loop and transport unbundling obligations. Qwest has failed to demonstrate that forbearance from enforcement of its

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\(^{63}\) TRRO at ¶51.

\(^{64}\) TRRO at ¶ 59.
loop and transport unbundling obligations will satisfy each of the three prongs of the Section 10(a) test. On the contrary, enforcement of these obligations remains necessary to ensure that both wholesale and retail prices are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Moreover, forbearance would neither protect consumers, promote competitive market conditions nor enhance competition in the Phoenix MSA. Accordingly, the Commission must deny Qwest’s Petition.

The Commission based its decision to forbear from Section 251(c)(3) in Omaha on a gross miscalculation of Qwest’s future market behavior and the ability of retail competition to constrain wholesale rates. Where an ILEC seeks forbearance from its statutory wholesale obligations and the evidence demonstrates that competitors rely on the ILEC’s wholesale inputs to provide service to their customers, as is true in Phoenix, the Commission should deny forbearance in the absence of evidence that there at least two alternative wholesale providers in addition to the ILEC capable of serving 100% of the customer locations in the geographic area for which forbearance is sought over their own networks and facilities. The Commission has previously found that “competition is the most effective means of ensuring that . . . charges, practices, classifications, and regulations . . . are just and reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory.”\(^{65}\) The charges, practices, classifications and regulations referenced in Section 10(a)(1) are not limited to retail charges, practices, classifications and regulations. On the contrary, the Commission may not grant forbearance absent a finding that enforcement of Section 251(c)(3) is not necessary to ensure that Qwest’s wholesale, as well as retail charges,

\(^{65}\) Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶67.
practices, classifications and regulations are just, reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory.

Qwest alleges that CLECs are utilizing its wholesale services to compete with it in every wire center in the Phoenix MSA.\(^{66}\) Indeed, Qwest’s data show that a significant number of lines served by competitors in Phoenix are provisioned over UNE loops and EELs purchased from Qwest.\(^{67}\) The Commission cannot grant forbearance on the basis of this competition because to do so would eliminate the very competition that Qwest alleges justifies forbearance.\(^{68}\)

Qwest did not provide the volume of unbundled transport it sells to competitors in the Phoenix MSA even though such information is peculiarly within its control. Qwest’s failure to produce this data constitutes an omission of proof that creates a presumption that the evidence would adversely impact its request for forbearance from the statutory obligation to provide access to unbundled transport.\(^{69}\) For this reason, the Commission should deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from the obligation to provide unbundled transport.

\(^{66}\) Brigham Declaration at ¶37, n. 71.

\(^{67}\) Brigham Declaration at ¶37.

\(^{68}\) See \textit{Omaha Forbearance Order} at ¶68, n.185 (”[g]ranting Qwest forbearance from the application of Section 251(c)(3) on the basis of competition that exists only due to section 251(c)(3) would undercut the very competition being used to justify the forbearance”).

\(^{69}\) \textit{International Union, UAW v. National Labor Relations Board}, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (party’s failure to produce relevant and important evidence of which he has knowledge and which is peculiarly within his control creates the presumption that the evidence would be unfavorable to his position).
A. Qwest Has Failed To Show The Existence Of Adequate Competition In The Wholesale Market

Qwest grossly exaggerates the level of wholesale competition it faces in the Phoenix MSA. Qwest lists a number of carriers that it describes as offering wholesale services to other communications carriers as an alternative to Qwest’s wholesale services. For the majority of the carriers listed, however, Qwest does not provide Phoenix specific network data, making it impossible for the Commission to determine whether or to what extent any of those carriers truly provide alternatives to Qwest’s wholesale UNE loops and transport in Phoenix. To the extent that any of those competitors rely on Qwest UNEs to serve their own wholesale, as well as retail, customers, and there is no evidence to the contrary, granting Qwest forbearance from the obligation to provide UNE loops and transport will not satisfy any of the three prongs of Section 10(a).

The two carriers that Qwest alleges do provide last mile access in Phoenix – SRP Telecom and AGL Networks – serve only a fraction of the buildings in the MSA over

70 Brigham Declaration at ¶¶49-63.

71 Brigham Declaration at ¶¶51-52 (quoting from the Cox Business website, but providing no information on Phoenix specific offerings); ¶55 (describing offerings of ELI while conceding that “ELI does not provide a local map of its Phoenix network”); ¶56 (describing AT&T’s wholesale offerings but does not allege that AT&T provides last mile access over its own network in the Phoenix MSA); ¶¶57-58 (describing XO’s wholesale offerings, but does not allege that XO provides competitive last mile access in the Phoenix MSA); ¶59 (describing Level 3’s wholesale business but does not allege that Level 3 offers last mile access in the Phoenix MSA); ¶60 (describing tw telecom wholesale services but does not allege that tw offers last mile access over its own network facilities in Phoenix); ¶61 (describing AboveNet’s network reach as including “over 1300 lit buildings and over 1.5 million fiber miles worldwide” but does not allege that any of those lit buildings are in the Phoenix MSA); ¶62 (describing 360 Network’s wholesale VoIP offerings, but does not allege that 360 offers last mile access over its own network in the Phoenix MSA).
their own network facilities\textsuperscript{72} and do not provide a sufficient level of competition to warrant relieving Qwest of the statutory obligation to provide access to UNE loops and ports. In any event, Qwest’s failure to disclose how many buildings its own network serves in the Phoenix MSA as a basis for comparison significantly dilutes the usefulness of the SRP and AGL data for purposes of determining the competitiveness of the wholesale market.\textsuperscript{73}

The Commission has previously determined that forbearance will not serve the public interest or promote competitive market conditions where, as here, it is likely to lead to an increase in prices for wholesale inputs that competitors need to provide service:

Specifically, we find that forbearance would be likely to raise prices for interconnection and UNEs (particularly those that may constitute bottleneck facilities), inputs competitors must purchase from incumbent LECs in order to provide competitive local exchange service. Because we find that the result of forbearance would be higher costs for competitive LECs which could impair their ability to enter and compete in local markets, we cannot find that forbearance would promote competitive market conditions.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Brigham Declaration at ¶53 (SRP Telecom’s network reaches 50 commercial buildings) and ¶54 (AGL’s on network building list names 64 specific in service or pending buildings in the Phoenix MSA). As of July 2006, the Government Accountability Office estimated that there were almost 8000 buildings in the Phoenix MSA with a demand of DS-1 or greater. See Government Accountability Office, FCC Needs to Improve Its Ability to Monitor and Determine the Extent of Competition in Dedicated Access Services, GAO-07-80 (Nov. 2006) at 20.

\textsuperscript{73} See International Union, UAW v. National Labor Relations Board, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (party’s failure to produce relevant and important evidence of which he has knowledge and which is peculiarly within his control creates the presumption that the evidence would be unfavorable to his position).

The result of forbearance from Section 251(c)(3) in Omaha was a tremendous increase in the prices for the loops and transport that competitors needed to serve their customers, leading one competitor to exit the market and another to abandon its plans to enter the market. There is no reason to believe that Qwest will not implement similar rate hikes in Phoenix if the Commission grants forbearance. For this reason, the Commission cannot find that forbearance would promote competitive market conditions.

In addition to being necessary to ensure that Qwest’s wholesale rates remain just, reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory and to preserve and enhance competition, enforcement of Section 251(c)(3) remains necessary to protect consumers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to open all telecommunications markets to competition and thereby make available to consumers for the first time a choice of local exchange carriers. The competitors that have entered the local exchange market in the last thirteen years have spurred the development and deployment of many advanced services, including DSL and Ethernet, that were just not available before incumbent carriers had to compete for customers.

The Section 10(a) criteria make clear that forbearance shall not be granted when it would frustrate the basic statutory goals. The unavailability of unbundled loop and transport facilities penalizes not only competitors, but also consumers. Qwest has shown that it is capable of pricing its competitors out of the Omaha market. It will do the same if given the opportunity in Phoenix. Depriving consumers of the competitive discipline on retail rates, the competitive spur to innovation and the competitive choice of carriers

75 Comments on Remand at 5-10.
and services made possible when Section 251(c)(3) is enforced would be contrary to the goals of the Telecommunications Act. For this reason, forbearance must be denied.76

B. The Retail Residential Market Is A Duopoly

Qwest has also failed to make an adequate showing of competition in the retail market to justify forbearance. At best, residential customers in the Phoenix MSA have a choice of Qwest’s local telephone service or Cox Cable’s local telephone service.

Qwest contends that residential customers have access to a wide range of competitive alternatives for affordable local telephone service in addition to Cox, including wireline CLECs, wireless carriers and over the top VoIP providers.77 Cox, however, is the only wireline competitor Qwest has identified in the retail residential market that does not rely on Qwest’s wholesale inputs to serve its customers. None of the CLEC’s Qwest names serve residential customers over their own networks. Instead, AT&T and Verizon both use Qwest’s Local Services Platform (“QLSP”), its UNE-P replacement product, to serve their residential customers.78 Arizona Dial Tone, USTel and DPI Teleconnect resell Qwest’s retail residential service.79 Because Qwest sets the

76 Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶61 (forbearance from enforcement of loop and transport unbundling obligations warranted only where Qwest faces sufficient competition to ensure that the interests of consumers and the goals of the Act are protected).

77 Qwest Petition at 13.

78 Brigham Declaration at ¶¶22-23.

79 Id. at ¶24. While Qwest alleges that there are other unnamed CLECs providing residential service in the Phoenix MSA (Qwest Petition at 23), its failure to identify them makes it impossible to verify the allegation. In any event, it appears that some or all of those CLEC’s use Qwest wholesale inputs to provide service. Qwest Petition at 23, n. 79.
rates, terms and conditions for its QLSP\(^{80}\) and resale services,\(^{81}\) carriers using these services cannot discipline Qwest’s retail rates. Lines served via QLSP and resale must be attributed to Qwest, and not the competition, when calculating Qwest’s retail market share.

As discussed below, neither wireless nor over-the-top VoIP services should be included in the competitive analysis. Qwest has failed to present reliable, verifiable evidence of the degree to which Phoenix MSA residential customers have substituted wireless or over-the-top VoIP service for their wireline service.

**1. Wireless and Over-The-Top VoIP Are Not Wireline Substitutes**

As it has done in the past,\(^{82}\) the Commission should reject Qwest’s contention that it faces substantial competition from wireless and over-the-top VoIP providers and that such competition should be considered in the forbearance analysis. Qwest has again failed to present reliable Phoenix MSA specific evidence to support its claims.\(^{83}\) The Commission has held that mobile wireless service should be included in the local services market only to the extent that it is used as a complete substitute for all of a consumer’s voice communications needs.\(^{84}\) In its decision denying Qwest’s earlier request for forbearance in Phoenix, the Commission specifically directed that Petitioners, like Qwest,

\(^{80}\) Pricing for the unbundled switching component of the QLSP product has been deregulated allowing Qwest complete discretion in setting the rate for the bundled product.

\(^{81}\) Qwest sets the retail rate from which the avoided cost resale discount is taken.

\(^{82}\) *Qwest 4 MSA Order* at ¶¶16, 19-22.

\(^{83}\) Qwest Petition at 10-16; Brigham Declaration at ¶¶36-49

\(^{84}\) *Qwest 4 MSA Order* at ¶19.
that seek to rely on mobile wireless substitution (or wireline cord cutting) to support forbearance relief “should submit complete and reliable data that is geographically specific to the areas for which forbearance is sought.” Despite this direction, Qwest again has chosen not to present complete, reliable MSA specific evidence. Instead, it cites to the National Center for Health Statistics (“CDC”) survey that presents wireless substitution data on a *nationwide basis* for the period January to June 2008. It also asks the Commission to make assumptions about Phoenix MSA specific data from the CDC’s estimates of wireless only households in the *state of Arizona* for the period July to December 2007, without acknowledging the Commission’s previous finding that the CDC’s state specific data is unreliable for evaluating wireless market share in the Phoenix MSA. The Commission should decline Qwest’s invitation.

Qwest also cites again to a report by Nielsen Mobile on wireless substitution in the Phoenix metro area. The report states that the wireless substitution rate in the

85 *Qwest 4 MSA Order* at ¶22.

86 See *Qwest Petition* at 17, *Brigham Declaration* at ¶14, citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January –June 2008, released December 17, 2008 (“CDC study.”)


88 *Qwest 4 MSA Order* at ¶21.

89 *Qwest Petition* at 19, *Bingham Declaration* at ¶16 and Exhibit 4; see also July 21, 2008 Letter from Daphne E. Butler, Qwest to Marlene H. Dortch filed in WC Docket No. 07-97.
Phoenix metro area was 17.8% in the first quarter of 2008. The Commission previously rejected Nielsen’s estimate of wireless substitution in Phoenix as unreliable because Qwest failed to provide a description of the methodology used to prepare the estimate. While the report submitted with Qwest’s current Petition is more complete than Qwest’s earlier submission, it still does not provide the detail necessary to make an informed evaluation of the validity of its estimate of wireless substitution in Phoenix and should be rejected. First, the Nielsen report relies heavily on the CDC’s estimates of wireless substitution, which the Commission has already determined are not reliable for purposes of estimating market share in the Phoenix MSA. Secondly, Nielsen reports results for the “Phoenix metro area,” not the Phoenix MSA, for which Qwest seeks forbearance. Thirdly, the report states that it is based on research “from a suite of research assets,” but provides no details on the survey methodology used in any of those “research assets,” making it impossible to determine their validity for estimating market share. For these reasons, the Commission must again reject the Nielsen data.

In an effort to address the Commission’s concerns regarding its previously submitted non-MSA specific wireless substitution evidence, Qwest commissioned

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90 Brigham Declaration at ¶16 and Exhibit 4 at 6. While putting forth the Nielsen study as a reliable estimate of wireless only households (17.8%) in Phoenix, Qwest also extrapolates from the CDC study to contend that well over 22% of Phoenix MSA households are wireless only. Brigham Declaration at ¶15. It also cites to the Market Strategies study (Exhibit 5) to contend that 25% of Phoenix MSA households are wireless only and this is the figure that it uses in calculating its market share. See Appendix B.

91 Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶21, n. 78.

92 Exhibit 4 to the Brigham Declaration at 2, 4.

93 Exhibit 4 to the Brigham Declaration at 4.

94 See Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶21, n. 78.
Market Strategies International to conduct a study to estimate the percentage of wireless only households in the Phoenix MSA. The Market Strategies study alleges that 25% of Phoenix MSA households have cut the cord and do not subscribe to wireline service. The methodology used to arrive at this estimate, however, has several flaws and does not provide a reliable basis for determining wireless only market share in the Phoenix MSA.

First, the sample size was heavily weighted in favor of wireless only households. Of the 791 telephone interviews conducted, over 48% (383) were conducted with wireless only households. Since the estimate that 25% of Phoenix MSA households are wireless only is based on the survey results and wireless households were surveyed at a disproportionately high rate, it is likely that the survey results are skewed in favor of wireless only households. The fact that the Market Strategies’ estimate of wireless only households (25%) is so much higher than the other estimates submitted by Qwest supports this hypothesis. Contrary to Qwest’s allegation that the Market Strategies study “corroborate[s]” Nielsen’s findings, the Market Strategies estimate of wireless substitution is 40% higher than Nielsen’s, which is far beyond the +/- 5% confidence interval claimed for the study.

95 Brigham Declaration at ¶17.
96 Brigham Declaration at ¶17 and Exhibit 5.
97 Brigham Declaration Exhibit 5 at 4.
98 See e.g., the Nielsen estimate (17.8% for the Phoenix Metro area) and the CDC estimate (18.9% for the State of Arizona).
99 Brigham Declaration at ¶17 and Exhibit 5 at 4.
Qwest’s attempt to explain away the huge discrepancy in the Nielsen and Market Strategies estimates is unavailing. The Nielsen estimate was based on data from the first quarter of 2008. The Market Strategies estimate was derived from interviews conducted in September and October of 2008. In order to bring the Nielsen and Market Strategies estimates into line, Qwest suggests that the Commission tack an additional 3-4% on to the rate Nielsen projected for Phoenix for the first quarter to reflect Nielsen’s estimate of the annual growth rate of wireless substitution, even though the Market Strategies study was based on data collected only six months later. Qwest also suggests that the Commission tack another 1.3% on to the Nielsen rate to reflect Nielsen’s estimate that the wireless substitution rate in Phoenix is 1.3% higher than the national average. There is no rational basis for either of these upward adjustments.

Secondly, Market Strategies does not explain how it selected the 791 households that were interviewed from the adjusted frame of 1,082,000 landline households and 1,230,000 wireless households. Instead, it states merely that “[s]amples were selected from each frame to be part of this study” and that it generated a “representative” list of wireless and wireline telephone numbers to survey. Market Strategies provides no

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100 Qwest Petition at 19.
101 Brigham Declaration Exhibit 4 at 6.
102 Brigham Declaration at ¶17.
103 Qwest Petition at 19.
104 Brigham Declaration Exhibit 5 at 14.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 3.
information with respect to how it determined whether a telephone number was “representative” or not, or what it was representative of. Without such information, neither the reliability nor the “representativeness” of the survey results can be verified.

Thirdly, Market Strategies does not provide the survey questions that were used in the interviews. Without the questions, it is impossible to determine the reliability of the survey results. Market Strategies contends that in a 5-minute telephone interview with 791 households, it was able to determine whether the respondent subscribed to landline service only, wireless service only or both; for respondents who subscribed to both, the percentage of local calls and the percentage of long distance calls made via wireless phone and the percentage made via landline phone; whether the respondent was Caucasian, African-American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Mexican, or other ethnicity; the respondent’s age; the respondent’s household income; the number of people living in the respondent’s household; and the identity of the respondent’s wireless carrier. That is a lot of personal information to be gleaned in a 5 minute telephone interview.

Because Qwest has failed to provide a full description of how the Market Strategies study was conducted or sufficient detail about the methodology used to arrive at the estimate of a 25% wireless substitution rate in the Phoenix MSA, the Commission cannot possibly use the Market Strategies estimate in calculating Qwest’s market share.

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107 \textit{Id.} at 3, 5-12.

108 \textit{Qwest 4 MSA Order} at ¶¶21-22.
The Commission should also reject Qwest’s conclusory allegation that the “existence of wireless alternatives constrains Qwest’s ability to raise prices for wireline basic exchange service above market levels because such an increase would likely cause many customers to replace their wireline service with a wireless phone.” Qwest offered no evidence that any wireless offering in Phoenix constrains its ability to implement rate increases or prevents the exercise of market power. While Qwest alleges that wireless services should be considered substitutes for wireline services, it failed to show any cross elasticity of demand – i.e., how much, if any, switching between wireless and wireline services is due to changes in price. “If customers switch between wireline and wireless access but not in response to price changes, then wireless is not a close substitute and cannot prevent the exercise of market power in the wireline market.” In the absence of any evidence that wireless offerings in the Phoenix MSA in fact constrain Qwest’s pricing, wireless and wireline should not be considered substitutes.

With respect to over-the-top VoIP service, the Commission should again find that Qwest has failed to present direct evidence of the degree to which consumers in the Phoenix MSA view over-the-top VoIP service as a complete (or even close) substitute for wireline telephone service. Qwest presented no evidence of subscribership rates for over-the-top VoIP service in the Phoenix MSA. Instead, it cites statistics for

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109 Brigham Declaration at ¶20.

110 See Declaration of Dr. Michael D. Pelcovits filed by Cavalier Telephone and TV in WC Dockets No. 08-24 and 08-49 on April 21, 2009 at 10 (emphasis in original).

111 Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶17.

112 Brigham Declaration at ¶27 (noting that it is difficult to obtain accurate subscribership information for VoIP services).
broadband subscribership in the state of Arizona and forecasts of VoIP subscribership nationwide. The Commission has previously found such forecasts completely unreliable for purposes of analyzing competition and market share. Qwest has provided no reason for the Commission to find differently here.

As it has done before when Qwest failed to provide reliable data concerning the full substitutability of over-the-top VoIP and wireless services for wireline services, the Commission should reject Qwest’s request to factor competition from wireless and VoIP providers into the forbearance analysis for the Phoenix MSA.

2. **Qwest Has Grossly Understated Its Residential Market Share**

   In calculating its retail residential market share, Qwest erroneously attributed the resale and QLSP lines to the competitive side of the equation. Because these services are provided wholly over Qwest’s own network, they do not compete with Qwest’s retail service and should be included in Qwest’s market share, not the competitors’ market share.

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113 Brigham Declaration at ¶27-28.


115 Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶22; see also Omaha Forbearance Order at ¶72; In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended (47 U.S.C.§160(c)), For Forbearance from Certain Dominant Carrier Regulation of Its Interstate Access Services, and for Forbearance from Title II Regulation of Its Broadband Services, in the Anchorage, Alaska, Incumbent Local Exchange Study Area, WC Docket 06-109, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 07-149 at ¶28 (rel. Aug. 20, 2007) (Commission declined to include VoIP service and wireless service as close substitute products in its analysis of the wireline market in the absence of data justifying the inclusion of such services in the analysis).

116 Brigham Declaration Exhibit 14.
share. Qwest also erroneously discounted its market share by the Market Strategies estimate of 25% wireless substitution in the Phoenix MSA.\textsuperscript{117} Assuming that Qwest’s estimate of the number of residential lines served by Cox is accurate,\textsuperscript{118} Qwest still retains more than a 50% share of the residential market. In the absence of any evidence of facilities-based competition in the residential market other than that provided by Cox, the Commission cannot determine that continued enforcement of Qwest’s wholesale obligations is not necessary to constrain rates, protect consumers or promote competitive entry.

As COMPTEL shows in its Comments on Remand, duopoly market conditions produce high prices, frustrate innovation and can lead to tacit collusion by providers.\textsuperscript{119} Two facilities-based retail alternatives to Qwest are the minimum necessary to discipline Qwest’s retail rates, terms and conditions of service. In the interest of protecting consumers and promoting and enhancing competitive market conditions, the Commission cannot grant forbearance in a retail market characterized by duopoly.

\section{C. Qwest Has Not Provided Reliable Evidence Of Its Share of The Business Market}

Although it claims that it is experiencing intense competition in the business market,\textsuperscript{120} Qwest has failed to present reliable evidence of its own share of business lines in Phoenix. In an attempt to quantify the level of competition in the business market, Qwest commissioned Harte-Hanks to conduct a survey. According to Qwest, Harte-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Id.  
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Id.  
  \item \textsuperscript{119} COMPTEL Comments on Remand at 21-26.  
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Qwest Petition at 26; Brigham Declaration at ¶32.  
\end{itemize}
Hanks interviewed “over 1,500 business customers in the Phoenix MSA to determine what telecommunications services the customers are purchasing, and which carrier(s) the customer are purchasing the services from.”\textsuperscript{121} Qwest did not provide the actual results of the survey, but instead produced only a three line chart that allegedly contains “Data From Harte-Hanks survey of Business Customers in Phoenix MSA.”\textsuperscript{122} Qwest provides no description of the methodology Harte-Hanks used to conduct the study, how the interviewees were selected, what they were asked or any other information to support the significance or reliability of the study. Even if the Commission were to give any credence to the unsubstantiated survey, which it should not, the data on which Qwest relies cannot be interpreted as anything close to a measure of facilities-based competition. Asking retail customers to identify the telecommunications carrier from which they purchase service would provide no indication as to whether Qwest is the underlying wholesale provider of the service or whether the carrier serves the customer over its own network and facilities. Without such information, it is impossible to estimate the percentage of the market served by facilities-based carriers using their own last mile and transport facilities.\textsuperscript{123} The Commission should reject the Harte-Hanks data as unreliable and unverifiable for purposes of estimating Qwest’s share of the business market.

While Qwest asserts that it faces stiff competition in the business market from Cox Cable, CLECs and VoIP providers and bemoans the decline in retail access lines it

\textsuperscript{121} Qwest Petition at 27; Brigham Declaration at ¶33.

\textsuperscript{122} Exhibit 6 to Bingham Declaration.

\textsuperscript{123} This is not a theoretical concern. As Qwest’s Highly Confidential Exhibit 7 shows, a significant number of CLEC business lines are provisioned using Qwest’s UNE loops and EELs.
has sustained, it reported strong revenue growth in the business market in 2008. In the March 18, 2009 Letter to Shareholders accompanying the 2008 Annual Report, Qwest’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer stated:

In a turbulent year that ended with a worldwide financial crisis, I am pleased to report that Qwest reported solid financial results in 2008, including growth in our strategic products . . . .

* * *

In a year when many in our industry reported declines in business revenues, Qwest reported 5 percent growth in our Business Market segment.

* * *

Even in the fact of tough economic times and pressure on our revenues, in the fourth quarter of 2008, we reported improving profitability in each of our three strategic business units – Business Markets, Mass Markets and Wholesale Markets.125

The other evidence on which Qwest relies to show competition in the business market – fiber network maps, the number of fiber route miles competitors have deployed and materials from competitors’ websites -- has been rejected by the Commission in the past as unpersuasive.126 The Commission should do the same here. In the absence of any reliable evidence in the record to reasonably assess Qwest’s or any other last mile facilities-based provider’s market share in the business market, the Commission must deny Qwest’s request for forbearance from Section 251(c)(3).127

124 Qwest Petition at 6, 27-32; Brigham Declaration at ¶¶3, 32-48.
126 Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶ 39.
127 Qwest 4 MSA Order at ¶¶33, 40.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, COMPTEL respectfully requests that the Commission deny Qwest’s Petition for Forbearance from unbundling, dominant carrier and Computer III regulation in the Phoenix MSA.

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/

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